This paper proposes different methods to aggregate heterogeneous policies for renewable energy. We compare time-varying indicators built using principal component analysis with average-based indicators. The main goal of the paper is to account for the evolution of both types of policy indicators with a set of common variables. Our empirical results are consistent with predictions of politicaleconomy models of environmental policies as lobbying, income and, to a less extent, inequality have expected effects on policy. The brown lobbying power, proxied by entry barriers in the energy sector, has negative influence on the policy indicators even when taking into account endogeneity in its effect. The results are also robust to dynamic panel specifications and to the exclusion of groups of countries. Interestingly, too, corruption has only an indirect effect on policy mediated by entry barriers, while the negative effect of inequality is much stronger for the richer countries.
Introduction
Environmental problems typically call for government interventions to tackle market failures associated with pollution and investment in green technologies. The current consensus is that an appropriate combination of policies should be conceived to stimulate the search for new solutions rather than mere compliance with technological standards or fixed pollution targets. In this vein, recent policy strategy combines interventions to correct pollution externalities (e.g. carbon taxes) with policies to stimulate innovation (e.g. R&D subsidies). These sophisticated policy interventions characterize in particular the field of renewable energy, making any evaluation of the policy effort across countries and time problematic.
Policies promoting renewable energy represent the most promising option to mitigate jointly GHG emissions and emerging oil scarcity, and can be evaluated using the rich dataset provided by the International Energy Agency, which contains time-varying information on Renewable Energy Policy (REP henceforth) for OECD countries. Figure 1 provides an overall picture of the evolution of policies in OECD countries, detailing the types of policies applied. The two oil crises of the 70s stimulated policy responses in almost all the developed countries, whereas an abrupt stop in the expansion of these policies occurred when oil prices started falling in the early 80s. A second wave of REP was implemented in the 90s in response to increasing concern for climate change mitigation. With regard to the policy adopted, certain cross-country regularities clearly emerge. A first phase focusing on RD&D (Research, Demonstration and Development) subsidies and grants is followed by a second phase characterized by a greater use of market-based instruments such as taxes, incentives and guaranteed prices and, more recently, tradable permits and renewable energy certificates. At the same time, diversification increased substantially as policies adopted earlier were often kept in use together with new ones. Diversification also makes it difficult to provide an aggregate measure of the effort by each country to favour the transition to renewable energy and to examine policy determinants systematically. In fact, aggregation of heterogeneous policies in a single indicator is not immediate because the available policies are measured either as 0-1 signal or on a continuous scale, e.g. Feed-in tariffs.
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The first goal of this paper is to build aggregate indicators of REP, which can enable rigorous evaluations of the policy impact on innovation and renewable energy diffusion. Using these indicators, our second goal is to test some predictions of political-economy models of environmental policies (e.g. Fredriksson 1997 , Lopez and Mitra 2000) . In these models, politicians maximize the probability of being re-elected by setting environmental policy so as to balance the interests of citizens and sectorspecific lobbies, including the lobby of environmental activists. The well-established result in both the empirical and theoretical literature is that the weighing factor assigned to these (potentially conflicting) interests depends upon the level of corruption, and this effect may be amplified or mitigated depending on other institutional factors (e.g. Fredriksson and Svensson 2003, Damania et al. 2003 ). Our empirical analysis shows that the impact of corruption on policy appears entirely mediated by its indirect effect on product market regulation, our proxy for incumbents' lobbying power in the energy sector. Moreover, the degree of entry barriers is, together with a dummy for the first approval of the Kyoto protocol in 1998, the best predictor of REP. Finally, citizens' preferences for a clean environment are better captured using both the first and the second moment of income distribution, consistently with models where the median voter decides on environmental policy (Magnani 2000, Kempf and Rossignol 2007) . However, in line with models where environmental quality is a good occupying a higher position in the hierarchical scale (Vona and Patriarca 2011), the negative effect of inequality on environmental policies emerges only for the rich countries.
The next section describes in greater detail the testable predictions derived from political economy models of environmental policy. This section will be followed by a section describing the methodology followed to build our dataset on REP and presenting the principal component analysis used to extract synthetic information from our heterogeneous set of policies. We compare the various countries' policy efforts using both the principal component analysis indicators and a simpler averagebased indicator. Section 4 examines the determinants of the policy. The final section draws the conclusions and sets out some possible applications of our indexes to examine patterns of diffusion of renewable energy technologies.
Determinants of Renewable Energy Policies
Policy plays a central role in fostering innovative responses to environmental problems. For renewable energy, technological learning is especially important to reduce the cost of energy production from renewable at the level of costs of polluting energy sources. Thus renewable energy policies are intrinsically related to innovation policies. Recent contributions emphasize this connection through the concept of 'double externality' on knowledge and pollution (Jaffe et al. 2005, Fisher and Newell 2008, Acemoglu et al. 2010) . In this perspective, a policy targeted to environmental externality alone is likely to reduce firm's competitiveness without fostering innovation, while combining it with a green R&D 1 subsidy could be a way to meet the competitiveness and the sustainability targets alike.
However, precise evaluation of the effect of renewable energy policies on innovation remains primarily an empirical issue. The effect of the policies considered in this paper has been addressed in three recent studies covering OECD countries for the period of mid-70s -mid-00s using the same dataset on energy policies, i.e. the one provided by the International Energy Agency (IEA). In general, policies seemed to have a strong effect on renewable energy technology, but heterogeneous across technologies and policy instruments (Johnstone et al. 2010 ) and generally weaker on per-capita 1. The need for subsidies and incentives is more pressing when green technologies display a strongly forward-bias profile, i.e. high initial investments in physical capital offset by lower variable costs, as for solar and wind energy. investment in renewable capacity (Popp et al. 2011) 2 . However, the policy effect appears underestimated without taking into account the endogeneity of the policy support (Vona et al. 2012 ).
In light of these findings, in particular, it may indeed prove useful to take a step back to look into the politico-economy determinants of renewable energy policy. The mainstream literature builds on the Grossman and Helpman model (1994), where multiple lobbies attempt to capture sector-specific policies by offering perspective bribes to politicians (Fredriksson 1997 , Aidt 1998 . As for the case of many environmental policies, the existing incumbents in the energy sector prefer less stringent policies and do the best they can to reduce policy stringency, while environmentalists support the approval of ambitious policies. The basic model's prediction is that the extent to which the chosen level of environmental tax differs from the optimal Pigouvian tax depends on the lobbies 'capacity to influence the policy. This, in turn, depends on the weighing factors assigned to the two objectives of aggregate social welfare, which mainly reflects concern for subsequent elections, and to the lobbies' bribes, which reflect the lobbies' capacity to influence specific policy such as environmental policy. The relative value assigned by politicians to the brown lobby bribe has been typically interpreted as dependent on the level of corruption, and the negative impact of corruption on environmental policy has been confirmed by substantial empirical research 3 . As for the green lobby, recent works by Fredriksson et al. (2007) and List and Sturm (2004) show that it has substantial influence on environmental policies.
In the case of energy, first it is to be noted that the polluting sectors are expected to have a greater incentive to form lobbies in order to capture environmental policies (Damania and Fredriksson 2000 Johnstone et al. (2010) show that guaranteed price schemes and investment incentives appear to play a major role in the early phase of technological development, whereas for relatively more mature technologies, e.g. wind, obligation and quantity-based instruments work better. This study also shows that the effect of energy prices, another dimension of the policy, is not statistically significant except in the case of solar energy. Popp et al. (2011) show that, among the policies considered, the dummy for the early ratification of the Kyoto protocol is the one that promoted the most per-capita investment in renewable capacity. Again, however, the effect of the policies is highly heterogeneous across renewable technologies, being much stronger for biomasses, waste and wind. 3. Fredriksson and Svensson (2003) extend the Helpman and Grossman (1994) and Fredriksson (1997) models to include political instability as well. Their model shows that the effect of corruption decreases when political instability increases as incumbent officeholders can less credibly commit to a policy. This prediction is confirmed in their empirical analysis of the stringency of environmental regulation in agriculture. Other aspects of the impact corruption on environmental policies are considered in variants of the same models and tested empirically by Fredriksson et al. (2004) , who consider multiple lobbies and their organization costs, Fredriksson and Vollebergh (2009) , showing that the effect of corruption is lower in federal systems, and Damania et al. (2003) , where the effect of corruption greatly depends on the degree of trade openness.
comparative advantages rather than to the costs of complying with regulations. In fact, whereas the production of energy from renewable sources is decentralized in small-medium sized units, the competences of the existing incumbents are tied to large scale plants using coal, nuclear or gas as primary energy inputs. Moreover, the high sunk costs of large-scale generation further exacerbate the lock-in of incumbents and should fuel their political opposition to the distributed generation paradigm.
Therefore, unlike models where deviations from the optimal taxation depend on the politicians' willingness to accept bribes, the bias in the politicians' behavior is, we hold, to be interpreted as depending upon the potential size of the bribe, which is proportional to the monopolistic rents of the energy lobby.
Following on this argument, the recent liberalization of energy markets should have reduced the incumbents' opposition, favoring the adoption of ambitious renewable energy policies. Clearly, one should also expect a stronger effect of entry barriers where corruption levels are high. However, we will show that, rather than being synergetic, the effect of corruption on policy is fully mediated by the indirect effect on entry barriers.
Renewable energy policies are also affected by social welfare considerations and depend on the aggregation of citizens' preferences. Since environmental quality is a normal good 4 , the wealthier households demand more stringent environmental policies to satisfy it -a prediction that is consistent with the empirical evidence at both the micro and the macro level In sum, both socio-economic and institutional factors affect REP, suggesting that a hybrid political economy model is the most appropriate to account for REP determinants. In particular, our predictions based on perusal of the literature are that both higher entry barriers and inequality should reduce 4. Actually, this effect is reinforced if environmental quality is a good hierarchically higher in the scale. The idea is that "concern(s) for quality-of-life issues, such as free of speech, liberty and environmental protection... arise only after individuals have met their more basic materialist needs for food, shelter, and safety" (Gelissen 2007 11. An important example is Japan, which during the period analyzed did not adopt any feed-in tariff schemes, but adopted many other REPs, and was the country with the largest energy RD&D budget of the OECD countries (about 3.4 billion dollars) in 2001. Moreover, Japan widely adopted other market-based instruments Secondly, these three policies have often been adopted in recent years, so relying on them to characterize the long-term evolution of policy effort could prove misleading 12 . Thirdly, the complete exclusion of the other instruments, e.g. tax and investment incentives (see table 1 ), would offer a rather incomplete picture of the overall policy effort since some of these policies are important to spur renewable energy technology.
On the other hand, with policy dummies it is possible to measure policy effort from a different angle.
An indicator based on adoption dummies appears to reflect more closely the overall intention of the government to pursue REP or, more generally, its commitment towards renewable energy. Dummy variables are available for many policies: tax, investment incentives, Obligations, voluntary agreements and European directives. Table 1 in the appendix offers a detailed explanation of each policy, including the continuous ones.
[ TABLE 1 through common factor analysis in order to collapse the huge set of indicators into two main ones 14 .
like: voluntary agreement between public and private sector; Capital grants, investment incentive for renewable energy installation and production standards. The same holds for Canada and Norway. 12. Especially for RECs, and in some cases also for feed-in tariff schemes, the adoption time is around year 2000, particularly in Europe, where the 2001 EU directive has established precise targets for the share of RES electricity in each EU Member State's supply. As a result an indicator based on this information alone can either present too many zeros or be composed by only on a single variable, e.g. public R&D. Identifying the factor affecting the adoption time of these policies represents an interesting extension of our analysis, but is beyond the scope of this paper. 13. Starting from the available country fact sheet on waste they differentiated between "strategy" and "effective policy", to which were assigned weights equal to 1 and 2 respectively. Similarly, they weighted the landfill tax dummy variable in accordance with the stringency of the instrument. To overcome the lack of robustness and accountability of which this technique is usually accused, we constructed three different indicators using principal component analysis 16 we include both the signal and the intensity to build this indicator. For all these indicators, the analysis generally produces between three and four relevant principal components (i.e. with associated eigenvalue>1) that have been used to build a single indicator as the simple average of the three 15. Principal components are generally normalized, and have mean equal to zero and variance equal to one, which provide a better interpretation of the resulting value, especially when employed in sequent analysis. The components obtained in the analysis are generally rotated to produce more readily interpretable results. The tables presented below refer to an orthogonal (VERIMAX) rotation, but also oblique rotation, not presented in the paper, yields similar results. 16. A major concern is that new factors are built using constant weights that exploit both the cross-country and the time variability. Clearly, building time-specific weight(s?) would be more accurate, but at the cost that interpretation of each factor would change over time. So, for instance, the first factor turns out to be composed mainly of feed-in tariffs for the first two decades and by REC afterwards. Bearing this in mind, we prefer to build factors using time-invariant weights. 17. In all three cases, the first principal component accounts for around 40% of the total policy variance, the second slightly more than 10% and the third and the fourth slightly less than 10%.
policy levels showing no growth together with Greece and New Zealand. The country ranking presented in table 6 is fairly well preserved across the indicators. There are, however, some discrepancies, which are due in certain countries like Japan, Norway and Canada to the absence of a national feed-in tariff scheme (which accounts for a third of the total variability of CONT_POL and has a high loading in the principal component), while cases like the Netherlands and Sweden have a better ranking in indicators based on continuous variables thanks to their higher than average level of REC target and public expenditure in R&D. These considerations also explain the correlation matrixes presented in tables 7-9, which, although confirming the high correlation among the three indicators, well highlight the differences between CONT_POL and COM_POL.
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Econometric Analysis of the Determinants of the Policy

Explanatory Variables
The review in section 2 identifies three main determinants of REP: GDP per capita (GDP_pc), income inequality (INEQ) and market structure. For the latter two, we use standard data sources (see the appendix). For the former, we use the index of Product Market Regulation (PMR) in the energy sector provided by the Oecd 18 . This index is also built using common factor analysis by combining objective sector-specific policies and regulation from different data sources 19 .The PMR index for electricity and gas aggregates three sub-indexes ranging from 0 to 6 (maximum anti-competitive regulation). The first is ownership, which assumes five values: private (=0), mostly private, mixed, mostly public and public Finally, the share of green deputies in the parliament captures both people's preferences for environmental quality and a political voice for environmental issues, i.e. the green lobby 21 . Also corruption (CORR) is on the whole insignificant and so not included, but in some specifications. As and transition countries. Therefore, differences in results across specifications may be partially related to this bias in the data availability. In Table 11 of the appendix, data sources and basic descriptive for each variable are set out.
20. The energy price variable has many missing values, particularly in Sweden, Belgium, Czech Republic and Slovak Republic. In the first two cases they were mainly internal values in the time series, which have been imputed as the average of the two adjacent years. For the other two countries this was not always the case and we preferred not to reconstruct the series before 1989 due to extensive lack of data. 21. Estimated coefficients associated with other political factors such as 'share of deputies in other countries', 'government composition', 'government instability' or 'government change' are unstable across indicators. The same holds for other factors affecting preferences for a cleaner environment such as the share of women in parliament (normally women are more pro-environment) and the share of over-65-year-olds in the population (normally older people are less environment-friendly . This is the route followed in this paper. However, it will be shown that both FE and RE estimates provide quite similar coefficients, suggesting that the trade-off is less severe in our case.
The relationship between the degree of entry barrier and environmental policies may be plagued by reverse causality and omitted variable bias. With regard to the former, a self-reinforcing mechanism can emerge because lowering entry barriers not only decreases the lobbying power of incumbents, but also strengthens new green players that will support more ambitious policies later on. Furthermore, technological improvements may represent an indirect source of endogeneity, as suggested by the seminal paper by Downing and White (1986). Omitted variable bias can be an issue here as we cannot account for all the factors that affect lobbying efforts such as coordination costs 23 . For instance, lobbies can keep affecting energy policy if existing incumbents remain strong after liberalization occurs. We hence use our time varying measure of corruption as an instrument for the degree of PMR.
The idea that corruption dampers the process of liberalization is in line with the previous use of corruption as a proxy for the lobbies' capacity to affect environmental policy (e.g. Fredriksson and
Svensson 2003). A highly positive correlation between PMR and CORR suggests that CORR is a good candidate to instrument PMR.
Unlike Fredriksson et al. (2004)
, we cannot use the sector size as a proxy for coordination costs that reduce the probability of forming a lobby. In fact, we cannot control for sources of sector-level variability.
Three caveats are in order to detail our empirical strategy further. First, lagged GDP_pc is included to reduce the possible unobservable correlation between the policy indicators and income. Secondly, we always compute cluster-robust standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity in the residuals. Third, standard tests for auto-correlation of the residuals do not reject the null hypothesis of absence of autocorrelation. We check the robustness of our results using the LSDV bias-correction procedure for dynamic panel developed in Nickell (1981), and Kiviet (1995 Kiviet ( , 1999 . This estimator generally outperforms IV and GMM estimators in all these contexts, like the present one, in which N is small and T is long (Judson and Owen, 1999) .
Results
In the following tables, we present the main results for each indicator. We focus mainly on the result on indicators built using principal component analysis. To highlight differences across indicators, we present slightly different specifications that enable us to stress those aspects which are more important for a given indicator. Another important caveat is that all the indicators are normalized to ease comparison of the estimated effects 24 . hypothesis that the RE model is also consistent, Wooldridge (2010) suggests focusing on the RE model. When energy prices and the dummy for DG are also included (model III), the results do not change except for GDP_pc, which turns out to be statistically insignificant. The effect of ENERGY is statistically significant, unlike that of the DG dummy. As shown in model IV, the dummy for DG has a significant effect only when combined in interaction with PMR 26 . In particular, the process of liberalization has a lower impact on the policy support in countries with initially more developed DG system. Model V and VI present our favorite specifications with the PMR indicator split in its three sub-indices. Of those sub-indices, only entry barriers significantly affect policy support. Unlike model III, the dummy for DG now has the expected positive impact on the policy. Moreover, the inclusion of area-specific time trend kills the effect of ENERGY, GDP_pc and, to a lesser extent, INEQ 27 . These 24. Clearly, we checked that this manipulation of the data does not affect our results. 25. Nothing changes in our results by using the exact time of ratification for each country rather than the Kyoto dummy. 26. We also checked the effect of other interaction terms (PMR with instability or PMR with corruption), but find no support for it. Results are available upon request. 27 . Results available upon request show that the inclusion of corruption, share of tertiary graduates (the only one that is statistically significant with the expected sign), political instability (measured as five-year moving average results are fully confirmed when using FACT_MIX_FEED (Table 13 ) and FACT_SP_FEED (available upon request). The only significant differences between Four more notable differences emerge from Table 14 Besides, the policy intensity seems unrelated to the factors affecting the timing of adoption. The case of feed-in tariffs helps understand this missing relationship: countries adopting feed-in early generally decrease the level of guaranteed prices after an initial phase of technological and consumer learning 28 . Table 15 shows that the effects of GREEN and, especially, of GDP_pc are weak and often insignificant. In turn, INEQ, ENERGY and PMR continue to show the same impacts. As before, the effect of PMR is lower in countries with a well-established DG system and mainly driven by entry of government changes characterized by a significant ideological gap) and women's share in parliament does not contribute to our understanding of REP. 28. Even if our cross-country variability in the timing of adoption of continuous policies is limited, we have tried to estimate a Cox proportional hazard rate model to see more rigorously whether our main variables affect the time of adoption. In fact, the probability of the CONT_POL being adopted earlier increases in the initial level of GDP_pc and decreases in the level of Corruption. However, we prefer not to include this analysis as we believe that the very limited variability of our dependent variable reduces the reliability of these results.
barriers. These findings are robust to the inclusion of a simple time trend, but less so to the inclusion of area specific trends (available upon request). Finally, model I' shows that CORR is significant at 90% level in regressions without PMR.
[ Table 16 ).
The last four columns of Table 16 Interestingly, the effect of the GREEN lobby becomes much stronger both in the GMM and in the dynamic specification -a result deserving further investigation.
As final exercise, we check robustness for omission of group of countries. Since our panel data are slightly unbalanced and we cannot test the effect of PMR and GREEN for all countries, we check our results in a basic specification with only Kyoto, GDP_pc and INEQ also including Mexico and Turkey (Table 17) . Then, while keeping Mexico and Turkey, we add PMR (Table 18 ). Table 17 shows that the Scandinavian countries and even more the USA drive the results for inequality. In turn, the effect of GDP_pc is slightly stronger when rich Anglo-Saxon and central European countries are excluded. Table 18 confirms the key role of the Scandinavian countries in accounting for the magnitude of the inequality coefficient, but this impact remains significant across specifications. The Scandinavian countries also inflate the size of the PMR coefficient, while Anglo-Saxon and Eastern European countries tend to squeeze it. As a general pattern, the effect of inequality tends to be slightly stronger when rich countries only are considered, while the opposite seems to occur for the effect of GDP_pc.
This interpretation is more evident looking at Table 19 , where we estimate the baseline RE model with area dummies with an interaction GDP_pc*INEQ. This finding on the reversal of the inequality effect depending on per capita income is in line with the theoretical and empirical findings of Vona and Patriarca (2011) for green technology, which could easily be translated into a political economy theoretical framework 29 .
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Conclusions
This paper proposes principal component analysis to aggregate heterogeneous policies targeted at promoting renewable energy. We compare the indicators built using this technique with simpler average-based indicators. In doing this, we implicitly test whether it is possible to identify a set of variables able to account for the evolution of both types of indicators. We draw inspiration from political economy models of environmental policies and adapt predictions of these models to the case of REP. Our main result is that three main variables common to all indicators can be identified: per capita income, Kyoto and entry barriers. The first reflects a classical preference effect, the second the role of international cooperation and the third the one of energy lobbies. Of the components of the PMR index, entry barrier fully captures the energy lobby's opposition against REP. Results remain robust when instrumenting market regulation and in more demanding dynamic panel specifications.
Here, the estimated effects are generally mitigated but less so by taking into account the effect of our relevant variables on the initial level of the dependent variable (especially for GDP_pc). Finally, the effect of the green lobby increases substantially in the dynamic panel specification.
Another important result is that the second moment of the income distribution matters in capturing aggregate preferences for environmental quality, but only for indicators using both quantitative policy measures and policy signals. In line with previous research (Vona and Patriarca 2011), the effect of inequality appears stronger the richer the countries considered, while the opposite occurs for the effect 29. Vona and Patriarca (2011) show that, with a minimum of non-homotheticity in the preferences for environmental quality, the negative effect of inequality on the demand for the green good occurs only for high levels of income per capita.
of GDP_pc. In particular, lowering inequality increases public support for more ambitious REP when basic needs have been met. All together, these results suggest that a hybrid political-economy model of environmental policy, where both competition and lobbying power are important, offers the most accurate explanation of policy determinants. Recent theoretical developments go in this direction and consider more closely both aspects of the political process (e.g. Wilson and Damania 2003).
Except in a few cases, we do not observe the expected theoretical effect of corruption on policy.
However, corruption keeps having an effect on policy that is fully mediated by its indirect effect on PMR. This result is important for future and on-going research, where we will analyze the effectiveness of our policy indicators on the diffusion and the development of renewable energy technologies. In particular, the influence that stronger green firms have on the renewable energy policy can be an important source of reverse causality affecting the relationship between policy and renewable energy innovation. Capital Grants and all other measures aimed at reducing the capital cost of adopting renewable energy technologies. May also take the form of third party financial arrangements, where central governments assume part of the risk or provide low interest rate on loans. They are generally provided by State budgets.
Dummy Variable International Energy Agency
Tax Measure Economic instruments used either to encourage production or discourage consumption. They may have the form of investment tax credit or property tax exemptions, in order to reduce tax payments for project owner. An example is the US production Tax credit for wind (1992). Excises are not directly accounted here unless they were explicitly created to promote renewables (for example excise tax exemptions).
Incentive tariff Price systems that guarantee above market tariff rates. In such cases, the Environmental authority generally sets a premium price to be paid for power generated from renewables.Some countries (UK, Ireland) developed a so called bidding system schemes in whichthe most cost effective offer is selected to receive a subsidy. This last specific case is also accounted in the dummy, due to its similarity to the feed-in systems. Cluster Robust standard error, cluster unit country. *,**,*** indicate significance at respectively 10%, 5% and 1% level. Cluster Robust standard error, cluster unit country. *,**,*** indicate significance at respectively 10%, 5% and 1% level. Cluster Robust standard error, cluster unit country. *,**,*** indicate significance at respectively 10%, 5% and 1% level. Specification  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VI  VIII Cluster Robust standard error, cluster unit country. *,**,*** indicate significance at respectively 10%, 5% and 1% level. In column VI-X we used the stata routine xtlsdvc implemented by Bruno (2005) , initializing the bias correction using standard one-step Arellano-Bond (1991) estimator with no intercept, and following Kiviet (1999), we forced a bias approximation up to N−1T−2. 
